


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Molly Kane

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International NGOs and the Aid Industry: constraints on international solidarity

MOLLY KANE

The *Make Poverty History* campaign, launched in 2005, mobilised citizens to press their governments at key moments throughout the year to take action to eliminate global poverty. Initiated and financed by international development NGOs (INGOS), the campaign appealed to a broad constituency, building unity around three demands: more and better aid, debt cancellation and trade justice. The call for solidarity and economic justice resonated with millions of people, who added their names to a ‘virtual’ coalition via internet petitions and public demonstrations around the world.

However, the campaign platform and strategies were not without controversy, even among participating organisations and their celebrity sponsors. The contradictions and limitations of the platform were especially apparent around the Live 8 concerts organised to coincide with the G8 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland in July of that year. While many argued that the concerts raised public awareness about the urgent need to respond to the ‘tragedy’ of African poverty, they and much of the public messaging associated with the campaign were criticised for reinforcing false and ultimately destructive perceptions of the relations between the African continent and the rest of the world. The politics of aid (better or not), debt reduction and trade justice have been a terrain of debate and struggle for decades. It is therefore not surprising that campaign organisers, as well as their supporters and detractors, struggled with the contested politics and inherent contradictions of an anti-poverty agenda that was grounded in development discourse and the power relations of the global aid industry.

Make Poverty History highlighted the growing capacity for Northern development NGOs to campaign for social change at a global scale. At the same time the evolving roles of INGOs within the ‘project’ of African development have also been problematic and justifiably challenged. This essay seeks to contribute to current debates regarding struggles for social justice by exploring some of the implications of an aid-focused, and aid-dependent, agenda for transformative international politics. The management of citizen consent within the global aid industry constrains transformative politics locally and internationally.

Molly Kane is Researcher in Residence at the Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche en développement international et société (CIRDIS), Université du Québec à Montréal. Email: molly.kane@icloud.com.

This constraint has been especially significant in Africa, where the institutions of aid, both public and private, have had an inordinately powerful and destructive influence on social, economic and political life as African peoples have struggled to emerge from colonial rule.

International NGOs are challenged to confront the ways in which, by implementing aid, even in the name of strengthening democratic civil society, they may be agents of legitimisation and reproduction of the very relations of power that they seek to transform. As integral social forces within the power relations of the aid industry INGOS often act as legitimisers of its paradigm of development, facilitators of consent with its structures of governance, and agents of discipline towards civil society in the South. The forms of constraint on transformative politics through development cooperation are passed on by INGOS to their civil society ‘partners’ in the South through donor-driven programming and accountability frameworks, conditioning to varying degrees the politics and praxis of the recipients and therefore the knowledge and action that could chart alternative paths to the future.

INGOS have diverse origins and the history of their varied politics and interventions covers a wide range of activity, from the ridiculous to the heroic.¹ Throughout the post-World War II development era voluntary, non-profit associations, based in industrialised countries and dedicated to various forms of international intervention—evangelisation, political organising, solidarity, charity, relief and education—have reflected the diversity of values and politics of the individuals and groups who formed them. These development INGOS have also reflected and, to some degree, influenced the larger contested terrain of ideologies of the postcolonial period.

The Kenyan activist scholar, Firoze Manji, has examined the role of development NGOs over the past five decades within the ‘historical processes which transformed the struggle for rights in Africa (emerging from colonial rule) into an arena for a particular model of development’.²

Certainly there were major problems faced by the newly independent States in addressing how the forces of production (whether industrial or agricultural) could be developed to drag Africa out of the destitution created by colonial rule. But the discourse was not about development in the sense of developing the productive forces. It was about creating an infrastructure which advanced the capacity of the new ruling class to accumulate, and smoothing away those inefficiencies that hampered the capacity of international capital to continue its exploitation. It was expected that, through trickle-down effects, poverty would gradually be eliminated. This was the agenda of ‘modernisation’, the paradigm of development which was to hold sway until the end of the 1970s.

Central to this paradigm was to see ‘poverty’, rather than rights and freedom, as the main problem facing ‘developing countries’. The victims of years of injustices, whose livelihoods had been destroyed by years of colonial rule, were now defined as ‘the problem’, and thus the stage was set for the entry of the development NGO to participate in the process of de-politicising poverty.³

The integration of INGOS into the logic and institutions of the development industry intensified during the structural adjustment period of the 1980s, when funding for INGOS from official donors increased at the same time that governments of debt-burdened countries were instructed to strip the public sector and implement macroeconomic policies that resulted in increased inequality and loss of livelihoods and basic services for the impoverished. The official aid donors, when confronted with the critique of the adjustment policies and the resistance of affected sectors of society, provided funding to INGOS, the ‘human face of structural adjustment’, to alleviate poverty and, ostensibly, to replace the services and functions of increasingly under-resourced and disempowered African states. During the structural adjustment period, known as the ‘lost decade of development for Africa’ (as elsewhere in the global South), austerity might have been the rule for the public sector, but it was not the operating principle for the industry of development agencies and professionals taking advantage of the privatisation of social welfare. As Manji explains:

The field of development had become ‘big business’, requiring an entourage of experts committed to the goal of making the unsustainable sustainable... The multinational or transnational NGO came into existence with the sole purpose of effectively delivering aid with the forms of ‘professionalism’ required by the official aid agencies. It raised funds on the basis of the global brand-name, whose image had become well-established among these agencies and multinational corporations as the guarantor of stability and reliability—the trustworthy depoliticiser of poverty.⁴

Some INGOS remained critical of the dominant discourse and the destructive policies of the structural adjustment period and were supportive of organisations in African countries resisting these policies. These INGOS made a significant contribution to the global solidarity movement to end apartheid in southern Africa, as well as supporting trade unions, women’s organisations, human rights movements and others. They continued to situate their action in internationalism and common cause, rather than in the neoliberal logic of development, as defined by the official donors. However, over time the increasing reliance on official development assistance (ODA) funding (from increasingly neoliberal Northern governments) had a homogenising effect on the sector as a whole, making INGOS ‘such an integral part of the political economy of under-development that they are now (as a whole) part of a system which contributes to the reproduction of impoverishment’.⁵

The downloading of international assistance to INGOS integrated their social action strategies into the priorities and policies of the official aid donors’ neoliberal ‘consensus’. The increasing financial dependence of INGOS on the aid regime created imperatives for adjustment within institutions and movements, as INGOS became more closely associated with and dependent upon the aid industry and its narrative of development.

INGO support for more risky and contested citizen politics also eroded in the 1990s as many became disillusioned and disappointed with the revolutionary movements they had once admired, and were comforted by the logic of a

technical approach to development as an alternative to the flawed and messy political programmes of social movements. In the early 1990s this turn, as well as pressure from official donors and questioning within NGOs about their own effectiveness, led to an increasing focus on ‘professionalisation’, and the documentation of ‘best practices’ for ‘concrete results’. At the same time concern with addressing the ‘root causes’ rather than the symptoms of global poverty drove many INGOS to seek ways to leverage change by using the lessons of the ‘field’ to influence the public policy environment. The targets of the policy formulation and advocacy agenda were often the institutions of the aid regime itself: donor governments, the World Bank, the IMF, UN agencies and even the largest INGOS, which had become powerful industrial actors. Remarkably absent in the emerging emphasis on policy advocacy among the INGOS was concurrent support for the efforts of civil society actors in the South to engage in policy debates and advocacy in their own contexts and with their own authority, provoking complaints from African activist intellectuals of a ‘fetishising’ of the grass roots and ‘intellectual resource extraction’ by the Northern NGOs.⁶

Today INGOS are active in most African countries as donors, employers, service providers, advocates and campaigners. In this multiplicity of roles they are also aligned with a variety of social and political actors on the continent. In their home countries they relate to governments and constituencies in a variety of often contradictory ways as well: as contractors, fundraisers, researchers, educators, advocates and campaigners. All are dependent on the aid industry and its development model for funding—and to some degree for their own public identity and authority. In practice, in spite of often laudable intentions, the politics of INGOS dependent on the aid regime for their own survival often reveals a greater willingness to manage the *coping* strategies of impoverished people, than to accompany their political struggles to assert their aspirations and claim their rights.⁷

These contradictions and dilemmas have not been lost on INGOS and their colleagues and partners in the South, nor on academic observers. The assessments range from self-criticism regarding ‘aid effectiveness’ and ‘development impact’ to outright condemnation of INGOS for being instruments of imperialism.⁸ Notwithstanding the differences among the critiques it would be difficult to argue with the observation that ‘Under all these pressures NGOs, on average, appear to have become instruments of public policy far more than of social movement strategy, and their language and discourse seems closer to that of public agencies than of social activists’.⁹ Global justice activists might have cause to lament that the funding relationship with the official aid regime has so deformed the autonomy, knowledge and values-base of many INGOS that their baby has drowned in the bath water. They are left with the question, ‘In the era of “aid effectiveness”, what has happened to NGOs as a location for dissent, alternatives and common cause?’.

The increasing presence of INGOS in global public campaigns and policy fora brings into sharper relief the importance of these dilemmas. INGOS are effective implementing agencies of donor-driven development strategies, providing a trained work force of technicians and effective discipline of social dissent by

manufacturing circumscribed alternatives to deep democratisation. Their own legitimacy rests on the moral and financial support they receive from people in their home countries, and the collaborative relationships they build with civil society organisations in the South. To win that support INGOS must offer themselves as agents of social transformation. However, to reach that potential they must also confront the ambiguities and conflicts of interest embedded in the terrain in which they have built their capacity to act. INGOS often insist that their merit lies in their autonomy and unique capacity to be agents of innovation, creating alternative approaches for social and economic development that can be replicated by others. However, as ‘embedded activists’, they have been integrated into a paradigm of social change that is inherently risk-averse and antagonistic to dissent.

Why should that matter? The political and cultural struggles of African peoples for independence from colonial rule were the beginning of processes of decolonisation in which the reconstruction of local and national economies was an essential element of self-determination. But the project of the powers that established the institutions to finance and control the development processes was not one of decolonisation. The project of postwar development assistance to Africa was fundamentally different from the Marshall Plan for Europe in its assumptions and modalities. International aid was not provided by the donor and creditor countries—as it was to postwar Europe—in order to rebuild what was understood to be a civilisation worth conserving and necessary for the prosperity of capitalism.¹⁰ Rather, colonial assumptions about the inferiority and backwardness of the ‘natives’ were perpetuated in the continuation of forms of tutelage and indirect rule through aid. More importantly, the project of post-independence development in Africa sought to modernise, not arrest, the extraction of wealth from the former colonies to the industrialised North. Even with its promise of a better future, the development project was constructed on the foundations rather than the ruins of colonialism.

Postcolonial development brought new forms of occupation and control that were accelerated and intensified as Africa became a bloody terrain for the Cold War and as the debt crisis worsened. Newly independent African countries had less than a generation to achieve their own social and economic reconstruction before the noose of debt servicing and the imposition of structural adjustment measures of liberalisation and privatisation began the downward spiral of the deterioration of local economies and the public institutions that might have provided alternative paths to the future.

This adaptation of colonialism was not limited to the perpetuation of the economic and material infrastructure that had facilitated the extraction of wealth from the continent. Perhaps as destructive in the longer term was the imposition of a myth, and the institutions to support that myth, that the future well-being of the colonised depended on their further submission to the knowledge and authority of those from whom they had struggled with such difficulty to gain their freedom. Margaret Atwood captures this state of social amnesia poignantly in her novel, *The Blind Assassin*:

The real name of the city was erased from memory by the conquerors, and this is why—say the tale-tellers—the place is now known only by the name of its own destruction. The pile of stones thus marks both an act of deliberate remembrance, and an act of deliberate forgetting.¹¹

Known only by the name of its own destruction: an Africa to be saved by charity, to be rescued from itself by those who have more, who can ‘give’ more. Rhetorical support for local knowledge and local ownership notwithstanding, the discourse and much of the activity of the development industry reinforce the view that those who *have more* to give also *know more* about how to build affluent societies, societies capable of enlightened philanthropy. However, the plague of social amnesia obscures the fact that the very capacity to ‘share’ has been constructed on the impoverishment of others, and the continuing expropriation of their resources and usurpation of their aspirations and strategies for self-determination. For the colonial era to truly give way to emancipation for the colonised, and to interdependence and cooperation for the planet, fundamental shifts in power, institutions and knowledge are required. These profound changes are never guaranteed, but it is certain that they cannot happen without dissent, risk and political struggle.

In grappling with the complexity, the despair and the hope of building a world in which humanity as a whole can not only survive but thrive, the aid industry project of poverty reduction and sustainable development within the ‘new pragmatism’ of neoliberal globalisation offers a less than inspiring pile of stones. It offers one more chapter in the story of the ‘White Man’s Burden’. As the Colombian scholar Arturo Escobar has observed:

Development fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational decision and management to be entrusted to that group of people—the development professionals—whose specialised knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task. Instead of seeing change as a process rooted in the interpretations of each society’s history and cultural tradition—as a number of intellectuals in various parts of the Third World had attempted to do in the 1920s and 1930s (Gandhi being the best known of them)—these professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a preexisting model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity.¹²

In the years since Arturo Escobar’s brilliant analysis of the power of development discourse to shape the very ‘space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined’,¹³ the discourse itself is still invasive of social and political life. Policy trends among official donors in response to critics of aid appear as a sort of collective *apologia* for the errors of the past. The World Bank and OECD donors increasingly operate within a consensus that, at least rhetorically, acknowledges the importance of knowledge for ‘local ownership’ of effective development strategies. In promoting its Comprehensive Development Framework the World Bank claimed it had repositioned its institutional role as a ‘Knowledge Bank’, working in ‘partnership’ with borrowing governments that now ‘own’ the policies they choose to pursue.¹⁴

However, in perverse ways this *apologia* has not actually opened much space for a fundamental challenge to the orthodoxies of the development institutions, and certainly not to the power relations that underpin these orthodoxies. Rather, a new set of buzzwords and common-sense assumptions has been imposed, with ever increasing uniformity of interpretation. This uniformity found coherent expression in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, an agreement of the High Level Forum of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), held in Paris in March 2005.¹⁵

The Paris Declaration, like earlier articulations of the donor consensus, such as the 1996 OECD-DAC report *Shaping the 21st Century: The Role of Development Cooperation*, assumed a necessary and beneficial alignment of national development strategies with the macroeconomic policy prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF. And yet, at the heart of much of the actual 'locally owned' development debates taking place among citizens' organisations and local officials, lies another consensus. This consensus makes very different assumptions, starting from the evidence of the devastating effects on developing country economies of imposed rapid liberalisation, privatisation and austerity measures for external debt servicing. It also recognises the effects of the interference of aid donors and debt creditors in local governance, thus inhibiting the functioning of legislative bodies and accountability of governments to citizens.

The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), an extensive five-year collaborative project carried out by citizen groups, developing country governments and the World Bank, assessed the impact of the liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation and austerity programmes that constituted structural adjustment programmes. The report on the SAPRI process, published by the members of the SAPRI civil society network in 2004, arrived at the 'stark conclusion [that] if there is to be any hope for meaningful development for countries of the South, and for the sustained reduction of poverty and inequality, the Western-inspired and imposed doctrines of structural adjustment and neoliberal economics must go'.¹⁶

The voices that were sought and heard [in the SAPRI process] were those of local populations often living and working at the margins of their respective societies. The issues that were selected for investigation were those that they had prioritised. And their analysis was based on an intimate knowledge of their own circumstances and on an understanding of the political economy of their respective communities and countries. Their hopes for a better future depend in good part on policy makers creating space for their ideas and actions...To date, that space has not been created. While political democracy has been promoted, albeit selectively from the North, real democratic choice for both civil society and governments in the arena of economic policy has been severely limited by the IFIs and the Northern Board members...In the field investigations, it is striking that the SAPRI civil society networks consistently focused their attention on the policies that had a direct impact on the domestic productive capacity of their respective countries...[The] major emphasis was on the need for policy shifts in key economic sectors, and on the enterprises in which most of the working poor are engaged, in order to better meet local needs and provide decent jobs and income. In the public

fora, gainful employment and the creation of healthy and productive local economies—through changes in prevailing trade, monetary, sectoral, labour and fiscal policies—were emphasised over the Bank’s far narrower approach to poverty reduction, which precluded alternatives to these basic adjustment measures. The state’s role was seen by civil society as being critically important, not only in providing essential services and in protecting the environment, labour rights and vulnerable population groups, but also in levelling the economic playing field so that the local enterprises can compete in the national as well as the global marketplace.¹⁷

Ghana provides a telling illustration of these dynamics. In 1992 Ghanaian poultry farmers supplied 95% of the domestic market, but by 2001 their market share had shrunk to just 11%. The accompanying loss of jobs had a serious impact on livelihoods of Ghanaians, not just of the poultry farmers but in related services and among suppliers as well. In 2003 the Parliament of Ghana passed a law, Act 641, to protect the domestic poultry industry from what the government itself had publicly acknowledged to be unfair competition from highly subsidised foreign poultry products. The law instructed the government to raise import duties on chicken parts from 20% to 40%. The act (which included similar provisions for rice farmers) was passed according to the rules of parliamentary procedure and it was consistent with the rights of Ghana under the rules of the World Trade Organization.¹⁸

The executive of the government, however, under pressure from the IMF during the government’s annual ‘Article 4’ consultations, refused to implement the law. The IMF had opposed the higher tariffs on the grounds that they would hurt Ghana’s poverty reduction programme. The National Association of Poultry Farmers took the government to court in order to force application of the law. When the courts decided in favour of the poultry farmers, within 24 hours the government pushed a bill through Parliament repealing Act 641, using procedures reserved for situations of national emergency. Civil society groups in Ghana, united under the Economic Justice Coalition, protested at the government’s actions, saying: ‘the fact that the government’s actions and failures in all these areas have been motivated by the government’s concerns to stay within the policy strictures and instructions of foreign bodies like the World Bank and the IMF is an outrageous abdication by the Executive Branch of government of its responsibility for policy leadership; its primary accountability to the people of Ghana; and its duty to uphold the sovereignty of the people of Ghana over their own affairs’.

The decision taken contradicted the expressed will of the parliament, the courts, poultry producers and civil society advocates for food sovereignty, economic justice and development, and democratic accountability. The perceived consequences for the government executive of not taking the ‘advice’ of the IMF were apparently more serious than the consequences of overruling significant sectors of Ghanaian society and national institutions of governance. This example reveals one of the most problematic aspects of the harmonised aid regime. Of course, the conflicts of interest between capital and the majority of the population were not created by the aid regime or the development industry.

However, the interference of the IFIs and the whole-scale endorsement of their policy prescriptions as a necessary framework for aid have implicated development assistance efforts in undermining fragile democratic culture and institutions. The result of this conflation is what Rita Abrahamsen calls the ‘disciplining of democracy’:

[The good governance agenda] reproduces the hierarchies of previous development theories whereby the Third World is still to be reformed and delivered from its current stage of underdevelopment by the West. Through such representational practices, industrialised countries retain the moral high ground, the right to administer development to the South.

The manner in which democracy is constructed within the good governance discourse has disciplinary effects. Democracy is constructed as intimately connected to liberal economic policies, and in this way alternative conceptions of democracy are marginalised and silenced...Moreover, the good governance agenda constructs democracy as relevant only *within* countries and not within international institutions and relations...Seen in this context, the concept of discipline is not reducible to ‘ideology’ or to economics, but unites them and derives its force precisely from this unification. The discipline of the good governance agenda works materially to produce processes and forms of political subjugation that help maintain Western hegemony.¹⁹

The disciplining of democracy through aid presents serious challenges for INGOS as part of global ‘civil society’. No longer called to be the human face of structural adjustment, they are arguably being asked to be the human face of global governance, within parameters set by institutions that are profoundly anti-democratic and increasingly and explicitly aligned with the strategic interests of investment capital and transnational corporations.

As the Ghanaian scholar Dzodzi Tsikata observes:

Time and again, the critique of liberalisation policies has been digested by the World Bank. The results have been distorted versions of our demands which are then imposed in our countries as conditionalities. In this way, poverty reduction and good governance have become the agenda of others on our behalf, while we continue to cede the control of our policy spaces to more and more acronyms—PRSPs, HIPC, MDDBS. The approach to development problems is now technocratic and formulaic with a vision which is more suited to a world controlled by transnationals than one in which states and citizens shape the direction of our countries.²⁰

The fact that many of the organisations promoting the cause of a better future for humanity are fully integrated into the aid regime’s development project has not prevented myriad, powerful expressions of citizen action and struggle from taking place in the world. Some of those inspiring initiatives are being supported financially and politically by extended international networks of people acting in good faith, solidarity and common cause, including within INGOS.

In spite of all the contradictions apparent in donor government foreign policy, this genuine solidarity includes the enduring public support in the North for development assistance spending for global poverty reduction. How those public funds are spent, in whose interest, to what purpose, under whose direction and advice, and with what ultimate accountability remain important and contested issues of public debate in the North.

The struggles of peoples on every continent—for democratisation, justice, environmental protection, control of local resources, respect for rights and freedoms, decent livelihoods and living conditions, peace and hopeful prospects for coming generations—are bringing new energy and insight into connections among communities and momentum for ‘occupying’ a new terrain of international solidarity and common cause. In the time of Tahrir Square, Occupy, and Idle No More, the struggle for human dignity, life-sustaining societies and a healthy planet is more starkly a battle for deep democratisation and respect for the sovereignty of peoples and our shared humanity. In this battle courage and vision are required for organisations seeking change to confront the constraints of the model of North–South relations that has gained ground over the decades of neoliberal hegemony, and to affirm the authority, legitimacy and vitality of those struggles.

Notes

- 1 A comprehensive presentation can be found in I Smillie, *The Alms Bazaar: Altruism under Fire, Non-profit Organisations and International Development*, Ottawa: IDRC, 1995.
- 2 F Manji, ‘The depoliticisation of poverty’, in Manji, *Development and Rights*, Oxford: Oxfam GB, 1998, p 13.
- 3 *Ibid*, p 17.
- 4 *Ibid*, p 28.
- 5 *Ibid*, p 25.
- 6 From personal conversations, meetings and conferences 1995–2005.
- 7 See A Bebbington, S Hickey & D Mitlin, *Reclaiming Development? NGOs and the Challenge of Alternatives*, IDPM, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, May 2005. ‘Notwithstanding the efforts of many to use poverty as a means of discussing politics, the tendency is still towards a narrow definition and reducing income poverty still remains the central goal—reflected in its position as the first MDG... While it is hard to contest the worthiness of such goals, this emphasis has the potential not only to rein in but also depoliticise the range of strategies open to NGOs in promoting development. There is at least some evidence that the demands for poverty reduction are affecting: the types of social organisations that NGOs work with (with shifts to production and credit groups and away from representative social movements); the types of intervention such NGOs engage in and support, with a tendency to seek poverty reduction impacts rather than redistributing effects; the regions of the world for which NGOs can mobilise funding; and the languages and discourse within which development debates can be couched’ (p 13).
- 8 See, for example, T Wallace, ‘NGO dilemmas: Trojan Horses for global neoliberalism?’, in L Panitch & C Leys (eds), *The New Imperial Challenge: Socialist Register*, London: Merlin Press, 2004, pp 202–219; J Howell & J Pearce, *Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2002; P Bond, ‘Global governance campaigning and MDGs: from top-down to bottom-up anti-poverty work’, *Third World Quarterly*, 27(2), 2006, pp 339–354; A Van Rooy, *Civil Society and the Aid Industry*, London: Earthscan, 1998; B Murphy, ‘International NGOs and the challenge of modernity’, *Development in Practice*, 10(3–4), 2000; Smillie, *The Alms Bazaar*; Manji, ‘The depoliticisation of poverty’; Bebbington *et al*, *Reclaiming Development?*; and BH Smith, ‘Nonprofit organisations in international development: agents of empowerment or preservers of stability?’, in WW Powell & ES Clemons (eds), *Private Action and the Public Good*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988.
- 9 Bebbington *et al*, *Reclaiming Development?*, p 3.
- 10 See D Sogge, *Give and Take: What’s Wrong with Foreign Aid?*, London: Zed Books, 2002.

- 11 M Atwood, *The Blind Assassin*, Toronto: M&S, 2000, p 12.
- 12 A Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p 52.
- 13 *Ibid*, p 39.
- 14 See J Pender, 'From "structural adjustment" to "comprehensive development framework": conditionality transformed?', *Third World Quarterly*, 22(3), 2001, pp 397–411.
- 15 For full text and background on the Paris Declaration, see http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 15 January 2013.
- 16 *Structural Adjustment: The SAPRI Report—Policy Roots of Economic Crisis, Poverty and Inequality by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN)*, London: Zed, 2004.
- 17 *Ibid*, p 222.
- 18 L Attarah, 'Playing chicken: Ghana vs the IMF', Corpwatch, 2005, at <http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=12394>, accessed 14 January 2013.
- 19 R Abrahamsen, 'African Studies and the post-colonial challenge', *African Affairs*, 102, 2003, p 203. See also R Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*, London: Zed Books, 2000. Emphasis in the original.
- 20 D Tsikata, 'Social scientists and Africa's future: towards alternative agendas, new alliances and a passion for democracy, economic justice and social development', *CODESRIA Bulletin*, 3–4, 2005, p 56.

Note on Contributor

Molly Kane is the former Executive Director of the Canadian international social justice organisation, Inter Pares, and is currently Researcher in Residence at the Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche en développement international et société (CIRDIS), Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM).